NO. 78-6486

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RECEIVED

APR 1 2 1979

OFFICE OF THE CLERK SUPREME COURT, U.S.

LEON DOUGLAS ALEXANDER,

Petitioner,

-VS-

W. J. ESTELLE, JR., DIRECTOR, Texas Department Of Corrections,

Respondent.

APPEAL FROM THE HIGHEST CRIMINAL
COURT OF THE STATE OF TEXAS

In Propria Personam

Leon Douglas Alexander #242667 Ellis Unit Huntsville, Texas 77340

SUBJECT

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CONSTITUTION

FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA..

IN THE SUPPLIE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OF ALERICA

APR 12 1979

OFFICE OF THE CLERK SUPREME COURT, U.S.

Appellant, I S. Ct. N78-6486.

W. J. ESTELLE, Jr., DIRECTOR, I TExas Department of Corrections, I Appellee.

ON APPRAISE FROM THE HIGHEST CRIMINAL COURT OF THE STATE OF TEXAS

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF THE SUPPLIE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AUTRICA:

JUNISDICTIONAL STATE THE

A typed copy of the Trial Court's Pindings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; attached hereto and marked exhibit "A". The order of denial from the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas is not attached for it is a mere post-card denying relief without written order. A copy of Appellant's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus to the Trial Court is attached hereto and marked exhibit "B", this is the only copy that Appellant has, the Respondent/Appellee has two copies already.

The "Equal Protection Clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution for the United States of America and this Court's ruling in Griffin v Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.E.891 (1956), this Court said: "(T)he central aim of our entire Justice system (is that) all people charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of Justice in every American Court'", Griffin, Supra, for this is a "Country dedicated to affording equal Justice to ALL and special privileges to none in the administration of its Criminal Law." id. at. 19, 76 S.Ct., at 591.

Appellant seeks review of an adverse ruling of the Texas Court of Oriminal Appeals; The Highest Court in the State of Texas on Oriminal matters, issued on the 21st. day of February, 1979. Appellant Jurisdiction is authorized by Title 28, Section 1252 of U.S.O.A.. Proper notice of Appeal filed with the clerk of the Court of Oriminal Appeals of Texas on or about the 28th day of Pebruary, 1979. A question of

Constitutional Law, as illustrated herein, has not been presented to this Court. Notice of Appeal marked exhibit "C", and attached hereto.

The Pifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution for the United States of America, and Title 28 U.S.C.A., sec. 1252 allow for such Appeals. The Pederal question presented herein is substantial, Zucht v King, 260 U.S. 174, 176-177, placing the burden of decision upon this Court to adhere to a question of Constitutional magnitude non-adhered too by the State Courts of Texas.

The following cases adhere to this Court's nower to hear this Appeal. Chisholm v Georgia, (1793); Marbury v Madison, (1803); Martin v Muntor's Lessee, (1816); and Mashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Mailway v Mallace, (1933), stated: "The Court accepted Jurisdiction to hear an Appeal from a State Court's declaratory judgement to hear, which was then a recent innovation. The Court said that the Constitution did not "crystallize into changeless form" the procedure of 1700, and 'so long as the case retains the essentials of an adversary proceeding, involving a real, not a hypothetical controversy, which is finally determined by the Judgement below, it is a 'controversy' as the word is used in conferring Jurisdiction in Article III.

Jurisdiction is also founded in the original Constitution, Article VI, Section 2, which states: "(2), "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the <u>Supreme law of the Lend</u>; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. (emphasis added).

The Constitutional validity of Article 42.09, Sections (4) and (7) of Vermon's Armotated Texas Code of Criminal Procedure are at issue; and cited verbatum as follows: ARTICLE 42.09;

Sec. 4: If a defendant is convicted of a felony and sentenced to death, life, or an term of more that fifteen (now ten) years in the Department of Corrections and he gives notice of Appeal, he shall be transferred to the Department of Corrections on a commitment pending a mandate from the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Sec. 7: All defendants who have been transferred to the Department of Corrections pending the appeal of their convictions under this Article, shall be under the control and authority of the Department of Corrections for all purposes as if no appeal were pending.

CONSTITUTIONAL QUISTICES PRESIDED:

1). Whether the Teras Legislature's enactment of Article 42.09, Sections .

(4) and (7) of Vernon's Annotatine Code of Criminal Procedure of

Texas; and the enforcement of such a provision by State Officals violate the "Equal protection Clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution for the United States of America?

2). Whether Appellant is denied "Due Process of Law" by the State Factfinders upon submission of a vaild claim concerning the validity of the State's accusatory pleading, wherein no written findings were ever enter by the State's highest Court?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant's denial of "Equal Protection of the Law" is a substantial question and should be review by this Court, for if filed in a District Court; andy adverse ruling against the State would or could be appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Pifth Circuit, this in effect would cause great delay in Appellant's release from such Unconstitutional confinement and would only further cause continueing harm as well as continued denial of his Constitutional Lights.

Appellant was transferred to the Texas Department of Corrections, over his objections, with his case on direct Appeal. Appellant filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Trial Court contending that his accusatory pleading was fatally defective and that he had been denied "Equal Protection of the Law" by his transfer to the Texas Department of Corrections (T.D.G.), with his case on appeal while others of his same class were allowed a choice of staying in the County Jail or submitting to said transfer; Appellant did not have a choice, he was forced to go to the T.D.G.

The Trial Court handed down Findings or Fact and Conclusions of Law (exhibit "A") on February 5th, 1979; to which was appealed to the Mighest Court in Texas for Criminal matters; Texas Court of Opinical Appeals; this Court denied relief without written opinion February 21st, 1979. Notice of Appeal to this Court was filed with the Clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals February 28th, 1979.

This particular contention has not been ruled on by this Court, although the "Equal Protection Clause" of the Pourteenth Amendment has been supended and ruled on in a great number of cases. Dvon Legislative enactment of 28 U.S.C., sections 2001 and 2002 concerning Equal employment; Fitle 42 U.S.C., sec. 1981 (42 U.S.C.A., 1931), also securing equality under the law. Even as far back as (1810) in Fletchen v Fect, declaring an act of the Ceorgia Legislature Unconstitutional concerning the sanctity of contracts, thereby ascerting the right of the Court to

pass on the Constitutionality of State Legislation."

Appellant has been denied "Equal Protection of the Law" by State Officals emforcing an Unconstitutional Procedure in the State of Texas by the enforcement of Article 42.09, Sections (4) and (7) of Vermon's Annotated Temas Code of Criminal Procedure. Other convicted of crime with ten years or less are allowed to choose there they wish to await the outcome of their Appeals, Appellant did not have this choice and was thereby denied "Boyal protection of the law" as guaranteed to him in Griffin, Supra, and many other cases as well as the very bases of our law, the Constitution of the United States of America.

Concerning Whether Appellant was denied Due Process of waw by the State fact finders upon submission of a valid claim concerning the validity of the State's accusatory plending, wherein no written findinco were ever entered by the State's highest Court?

Appellant filed application for a Trit of Haboas Corpus with the Priol Court ascerting the fact that the State's accusatory pleading was fundamentally defective and thereby void and disallored the Prial Court proper Jurisdiction to enter Judgement, since the pleading Sailed to allege an offence against the laws of the State.

Appellant stood charged by indictment with "Aggrivated Robbery". Vernon's Annotated Texas Penal Code, Sections 29.02 and 29.03 are gited as follows:

Section 29.02: Robbery:

(a) A person cormits an offense if, in the course of commiting theft as defined in Chapter 31 of this Code and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, he;

(1) intentionally, 'movingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another: or

(2) intentionally or knowingly thematens or places enother in fear of imminent bodily injury or donth. (b) An offense under this Section is a felony of the record demree.

Section 29.03: Aggrivated lobbery:

(a) A person commits an offence if he commits robbery as defined in Section 23.02 of this Code, and he:

(1) causes sorious bodily injury to another; or (2) uses or exhibits a deadly weamon. (b) An offense under this section is a felony of the First degree.

Appellant's indictment reads(in pertinent part) as follows:

. . . did then and there unlawfully, while in the course of committing theft of one watch, then and there of the value of ten dollars, one ring, then end there of the value of ten dellars, and two hundred sinty collars in current money of the United States of America, all which, in the ag regate, is hereincator called the property, and with intent on Defendant's part, which he then and there had, and by suing and subjitting a deadly weamon, namely a pictol, Defendant did knowingly and intentionally throaten Joe Camacho with and place him in fear of inminent bodily injury and death,

Appellant's indictment fails to recite the following prerequisites mandated by the Statutory provisions of Texas:

- 1). Appellant's indictment fails to allege "ownership in the complainant"
- 2). Appellent's indictment fails to allege "without the consent of the owner".
- 3). Appellant's indictment fails to allege With intent to degrive the owner of the value and approperiate the property to the benefit of of the taker".

The Temas Court of Criminal Appeals wrote in Misich w Stobe, 51 SW2d. 715-715 (1932): "It is elementary as well as Statutory, that the essential element of theft is that the property be taken not only fraudulently but without the consent of the owner, with the intent to deprive the owner of the value and appropriate the property to the benefit of the taker ... " Many other cases could be cited

Black's Law Dictionary defines Robbery as : "Pelonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate prosence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or feem. "

Dlac't's Law Dictionary defines Theft: "A popular name for larceny. The freedulent taking of corporeal personal property belonging to another, from his postention, or from the possession of some remson holding the same for him, without his concent, with intent to destive the owner of the value of the same, and to appropriate it to the use or banefit of the person laking.

Not only are "Tobberg" and "Theft" like offences; but the Statutory provisions of Section 29.02 plainly state "as defined in Chapter 31 of this Code"; Chapter 31 being the "Theft" Statute and containing the elements as cited in Black's Law Dictionary and cited as being omnitted from Appellant's accuratory pleading, upon which was predicted his Judgement of conviction, and is null and void for lack of citing the Statuting provisions as prescribed by State law.

The validity of the indictment must be determined by practical, not technical, considerations, United States v Bondon, 550 F.2d. 203 (5th. Cir. 1977); United States v Harltham, 537 F.2d. 187 (5th.Cir. 1976); cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041, 97 3. Ut. 739, 50 L.Ed.2d. 752 (1977). inst, the indictment must contain the elements of the offense charged and fairly inform the Defendant of the charge against which he must defend, amlin et al v United States, 418 U.S. 37, 94 S.Ct. 2807, 41 L. 2.2d. 200 (1974); United States v Cuthartz, 573 F.2d. 225 (1978).

It is quite obvious that the Trial Court did not have Jurisdiction to enter Judgement since the State's accusatory pleading failed to state an offense prosecutable under the Laws of Texas. Appellant is illegally confined and any further delay in ruling on the Denial of his Fourteenth Amendment Lights would only further the punishment that is truly Unconstitutional.

CONCLUSION

Appellant has been denied "Equal Protection of the Law" by the enforcement of an Union titutional procedural provision of State Law. Appellant being transferred to the penatentuary while others of his same class are allowed to choose their place of confinement while awaiting the outcome of their appeals.

Appellant has been denied "Due Process of Lew" by the State's failure to comply with Statutory provisions of State Law in their seeking of an accusatory pleading, which failed to state an offense upon which a Judgement could truly rest.

Management and is we an order allowing this Appeal; order an Attorney Appointed; and set the same down for Oral arguments and hearings in order that Justice may be done, and to the end that an order may be issued releasing him from any further illegal and Unconstitutional confinement. For all these things Appellent ever prays.

Respectfully Submitted

Leon Douglas Alexander #242667 Ellis Unit Huntsville, Tomas 77340

of March, 1979 A.D.

MOTARY PUBLIC IN AND SO

DELWIN O. BRGESCHE HOTARY PUBLIC. WALKER CO. TEXAS MY COMMISSION EXPIRES. 6.3070 APPENDIX

COURT OF CRIMINA! APPEALS OF TEXAS CLERK'S OFFICE

Austin, Texas. FEB 21 1979

Dear Sir:

Thomas Lowe, Clerk

This is not marked as an exhibit, it is the only copy that I have with no way for gettin other copies....

WIR MC. W/9-10007-H

II PAMES)	THE THE GREEN AL	
)	DISTRICT COURT NO. 1	
LECT CUTLAS ADDIA D.R.)	DALLIAS, COULTY, T. ELAS	

FINDRINGS OF TACE AND CONCEUSIONS OF LAW

From the circumstances presented in this case the Court is of the opinion that the Peticioner is abusing the habeac corrus process.

- The Court &s of the opinion that the Petitioner's Application for writ of habeas corpus is t tally without merit and recommends that the same be denied.

ONAINS OF THE COURT

In implementing the Court's Findings of Pact and Conclusions of Law, the Clark will:

- 1). Prepare a transcript of all papers in this cause and transmit the Court's Pindings and Order, including the Judgement, sentence, indictment, docket sheet, and other exhibits and evidentuary matter filed in the trial records of this cause, and transmit the same to the Court of Criminal Appeals as provided by the provisions of Article 11.07, V.A.C.....
- 2). Send a copy of these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the Order thereon, to the Petitioner and him Councel by depositing same in the U.S. Mail.

SIGNED AND HER DETER the & day on Feb., 1979.

JUDGE DE the trick vudge)

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LEON DOUGLAS ALEXANDER, Petitioner,	IN CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT
-vs-	NO. I IN AND FOR DALLAS COUNTY
W.I ESTELLE In Director A	DALLAS, TEXAS.
W.J. ESTELLE, Jr., Director, Texas Dept. Of Corrections,	WRIT NO.
Respondent.	

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABBAS CORPUS

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF THE SAID COURT:

COME: NOW, Leon Douglas Alexander, Petitioner herein and presents to this Court his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. This petition is presented pursuant to and in accordance with Vernon's Ann, C.C.P., Articles 11.07 and 11.59 and under the case authority of Ex Parte Young, 418 SW2d. 824; Imhoff v State, 453 F.2d. 894; Cf., Picord v Connor, 404 U.S. 270.

Petitioner states upon his oath that he is being illegally and Unconstitutionally confined of his life and liberty at the Ellis Unit of the Texas Department of Corrections in Walker County, Huntsville, Texas, by the Respondent herein, due to an order entered by this Court on or about the ninth(9) day of September, 1974.

I

Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of "Robbery with Firearm", Grand Jury True Bill of Indictment No. C-74-6763-IH.

The Jury found Petitioner guilty of "Aggrivated Robbery" as shown in the Court's Judgement and sentence; (neither of which are attached, due to petitioner's indigency). After being found guilty and sentenced by the Court; Petitioner gave timely Notice of Appeal. Petitioner was then transferred to the Department of Corrections; with his case on Direct Appeal.

II

GROUNDS FOR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT

1). Petitioner's indictment is fatelly defective in that it fails to allege "ownership in the complainant."

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- 2). Petitioner's indictment is fatallu defective in that it fails to allege "without the consent of the owner."
- 3). Petitioner's indictment is fatally defective in that it fails to allege "with the intent to deprive the owner of the value and appropriate the property to the benefit of the defendant, Leon Douglas Alexander."
- 4). Petitioner was adjudged guilty and sentenced on a charge of "agg-rivated Robbery" wherein the State's accusatory pleading alleged "Robbery with Firearm".
- 5). Petitioner was denied Due Process of State law in being transferred to the Texas Department of Corrections with his case on direct Appeal; even further he was denied "Equal Protection" of the law; by said transfer, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution of America.

III

FACTS: ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES:

FIRST; SECOND; THIRD, and FOURTH Grounds of ERROR re-stated with argument and authorities in support thereof: In Brief: Petitioner's Indictment is "multiplee"; "fatally defective" for it fails to allege "ownership in the complainant"; it further fails to allege "without the consent of the owner"; and even further fails to allege "with the intent to deprive the owner of the value and appropriate the property to the benefit of the taker", (or defendant, been Douglas Alexander); even if further the body of the indictment charges (or gails to charge), "aggrivated robbery" wherein the indictment under charged offense states, "robbery with firearm".

Petitioner's indictment reads in pertinent part as follows:
... did then and there unlawfully, while in the course of committing theft of one watch, then and there of the value of ten dollars, one ring, then and there of the value of ten dollars, and two hundred sixty dollars in current moneyof the United States of America, all which, in the aggregate, is hereinafter called the property, and withintent on defendant's part, which he then and there had, and by using and exhibiting a deadly weapon, namely a pistol, defendant did knowingly and intentionally threaten Joe Camacho with and place him in fear in imminent bodily injury and death,

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals wrote in Musick v State, 121 Tex.Cr.R. 616, 51 SW2d. 715-716 (1932): "It is elementary as well as statutory, that the essential element of theft is that the property be taken not only fraudulently but without the consent of the owner, with the intent to deprive the owner of the value and appropriate the

the property to the benefit of the toker - - - (I)t is said that the definition of larceny which omits 'without the consent of the owner' in now universally conceded to be defective." (emphasis supplied).....

The statutory provision for "Robbery" and "Aggrivated Robbery" as defined in Vernon's Ann. Texas Penal Code, Sections 29.02 and 29.03 state:

Sec. 29.02: Robbery:

(a) A person committs an offense if, in the course of committing theft as defined in Chapter 31 of this Code and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, he:

(1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes

bodily injury to another; or

(2) intentionally or knowingly threatens of places
another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death.

(b) An offense under this Section is a felony of the second
degree.

Sec. 29.03: Aggrivated Robbery:

(a) A person commits an offense if he commits robbery as defined in Section 29.02 of this code, and he:

(1) causes serious bodily injury to another; or

(2) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon.

(b) An offense under this section is a felony of the First degree

The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that robbery and theft are like offenses; robbery being no more than aggrivated theft. Horne v State, 508 SW2d. 643. Petitioner's indictment is fatally defective for it fails to allege an offense against the laws of Texas. Long v State, 548 SW2d.897. It has been held that a fundamentally defective indictment may be challenged by way of post conviction application for writ of habeas corpus. Ex Parte Jones, 542 SW2d. 179; Ex Parte Banks, 542 SW2d. 183.

In failure to allege ownership of the property; see, <u>lucero v State</u>, 502 SW2d. 128; <u>Bouie v State</u>, 528 SW2d. 587; <u>Arline v State</u>, 529 SW2d. 73; <u>Ainsworth v State</u>, 531 SW2d. 613; <u>French v State</u>, 531 SW2d. 613; <u>Batro v State</u>, 531 SW2d. 614; <u>Pittman v State</u>, 532 SW2d. 97; <u>Page v State</u>, 532 SW2d. 341; <u>Franks v State</u>, 532 SW2d. 631; <u>Jones v State</u>, 535 SW2d. 184(1976); <u>Sellers v State</u>, 536 SW2d. 564 (1976); <u>Adams v State</u>, 540 SW2d. 733 (1976).

As stated in the statutory provision, in charging "robbery" under V.A.T.P.C., sec. 29.02: "A person commits an offense, if, in the course of committing theft as defined in Chapter 31 (being the theft statute) of this code" and - - -,. Therefore the definition in Chapter 31 is a mandatory prequisite to the offense of "Robbery" or "Aggrivated Robbery"; therefore in this case, the State's pleading totally fails to allege an offense prosecutable in this Court.

The indictment having failed to charge an offense as prescribed by statute and having on its face the proported offense of "aggrivated robbery"; wherein the charged offense is "robbery with firearm" to which there is no statutory provision for said charge under the present (New) Penal Code, effective January 1st, 1974.

Petitioner was denied Due Process of State law in being transferred to the Texas Department of Corrections with his case pending direct appeal; even further he was denied "Equal Protection" of the law, by said transfer, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of The United States Constitution of America.

As stated; Petitioner was transferred to the "exas Department of Corrections with his case pending direct appeal. The Court of criminal Appeals has ruled as far back as 1911 in Ex Parte Brandenberg. 140 S.W. 780, "That the judgement of the Court of Criminal Appeals attaches immediately upon the entry of "Notice of Appeal", and stays any punishment assessed the Appellant. Prisoners who perfect an Appeal to this Court have a right to have their Appeals passed on by this Court before suffering any of the punishment assessed against them ..."

This same ruling has been re-stated in many cases, see <u>Carter v</u>
<u>State</u>, 510 SW2d. 323 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974); and <u>Baker v State</u>, 520 SW2d.
782 (Tex.Cr.App. April 2, 1975); <u>Baker</u>, <u>supra</u>, re-stating the holding in <u>Bx Parte Brandenberg</u>, <u>supra</u>, after the enactment of the provisions of Article 42.09 (4) and (7), to which makes this transfer possible, see Vernon's Ann.C.C.P., art. 42.09 (4)(7). The enactment of art. 42.09 (4)(7) are totaly Unconstitutional, for they deprive this Petitioner of Equal Protection of the Law.

The "Equal Protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embodies
"Equal Pravileges" and "Equal Immunities"; therefore, whether considered
as a "pravilege" or "immunity"; Petitioner has been denied a vested
Constitutional Right.

The harm to Petitioner has been done; there is no retraction for such a denial. Petitioner has stated a prima facie case upon which relief must be granted, his Constitutionally protected rights have been abridged. There is no adequate remedy less than to grant the relief requested herein.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner has fixed the burden of proof and shown by more than a preponderance of the evidence that his rights guaranteed by statute and constitutional law have been denied. Petitioner merits no less than to have his case remanded to the Trial Court and an order of Dismissal issued under the present indictment. The indictment in Petitioner's case is fatally defective; failing to allege an offense against the laws of Texas. Petitioner was denied due process and equal protection of the law in his transfer to the department of corrections, and therefore his case must be reversed and remanded.

WHEREPORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant and issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus forthwith and that he be brought forthwith without delay before this Court for proper consideration of the issues involved and that upon final hearing to the end that Petitioner may be discharged from such illegal confinement and restraint ... For all these things Petitioner ever prays....

STATE OF TEXAS COUNTY OF WALKER)

AFFIDAVIT

Before me, the undersigned authority, appeared Leon Douglas Alexander on this 10 day of MARCh , 1979, A.D., and who being by me duly SWORN did depose upon his oath the following:

- I, Leon Douglas Alexander, state that I am a pauperis person unable to pay the cost of the above and herein attached action, styled, Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, numbering five(5) pages;
- I, Leon Douglas Alexander, have read the foregoing and herein attached Petition for a Writ Of HabeasCorpus, and I swear upon my oath that is is true and correct.

#242667 Ellis "nit Huntsville, Texas 77340

SWORN and subscribed to before me this 10 day

HOTARY PUBLIC IN AND PO WALKER COUNTY T T A S.

DELWIN C. BROESCHE NOTARY PUBLIC. WALKER CO. TEXAS MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 6 30 21

EX PARTE	i	IN THE COURS OF CRIMINAL ASSESSED
		IN AND POT THE STATE OF THEAS
LEON DOUGLAS ALEXANDER	1	AT AUSTIN, T E N A S.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Formal Notice of Appeal is herein given from this court to the Supreme Court of the United States Of America; under the prescribed authority of the Federal Rules Governing such Appeals.

> espectfully Sub-12 bod Leon Douglas Alexander #242667 Ellie Unit Buntaville, Texas 77340

Done at unteville, Walker County this day of Féb. 1979 4.0.

Sall and subscribed to before me this day 02 - Tel. 1979 A.D.

Notary ublic

Appellant Ino

L.A. STEELE WALKEDOO TEXAS

EXhibit ""